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Abstract At the heart of the epistemic injustice debate is Fricker’s claim that an
agent can be harmed purely in their capacity as a knower. For Fricker, this harm
occurs in cases of epistemic injustice, where an individual’s testimony is underval-
ued due to the prejudice of their audience. In this paper, I consider Fricker’s claim
that these cases involve a ‘distinctly epistemic kind of injustice.’ I argue that Fricker
relies too heavily on her virtue epistemological commitments which leads her to
conπate moral and epistemic concerns in cases of epistemic injustice. Concluding
that we therefore we need to be more precise about what it means for an agent to
be harmed as a knower, in the second part of the paper I sketch a theory-neutral
distinction between epistemic harms, where knowers are restricted from access to
a knowledge exchange, and moral harms, where moral agents are negatively af-
fected by morally impermissible actions. I suggest that this distinction can enable
us to be clearer about the harm done in cases of epistemic injustice and help us
identify who is responsible. The paper ends with suggestions for further research.
1 Introduction
Placed at the intersection of ethics and epistemology, the epistemic injustice debate
examineswhere our roles as knowers andmoral agents coincide. Crucial to this debate
is the claim, proposed byMiranda Fricker in her seminal book Epistemic Injustice,1 that
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1. Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (OxfordUniversity Press, 2007),
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an individual can be harmed purely in their capacity as a knower. In Fricker’s central
cases this harm occurs when epistemic agents are not trusted to be competent testięers
due to the prejudice of their audiences.2
In this paper, I consider Fricker’s claim and argue that we need to be more precise
about what it wouldmean for a harm to be epistemic. I sketch a theory-neutral distinc-
tion between epistemic harms, where a knower has restricted access to a knowledge
exchange, and moral harms, where moral agents are negatively aěected by morally
impermissible actions. I suggest that this distinction can enable us to be clearer about
the harm done in cases of epistemic injustice and help us identify who is responsible.
In §2, I set out Fricker’s account of epistemic injustice and discuss two central cases
to illustrate the phenomenon. In §3 I consider Fricker’s own characterisation of the
harm done in cases of epistemic injustice and argue that her commitment to virtue
epistemology causes her to conĚate moral and epistemological concerns. In §4 I sketch
a theory-neutral distinction between epistemic harms andmoral harms and apply it to
the cases introduced in §2 and in §5 I respond to possible objections to my distinction.
Finally, I consider the challenge of extending the account to cases of structural injustice
and discuss avenues for future research.
2 Deοning epistemic injustice
2.1 Two concepts of epistemic injustice
David Coady distinguishes between two aĴempts to identify a type of injustice that is
purely epistemic.3 The ęrst characterises epistemic injustice as an unjust distribution
of epistemic goods (e.g. knowledge and education).4 While certainly a prevalent social
injustice, Fricker argues that this understanding of ‘epistemic injustice’ is not properly
epistemic because the fact that the good in question is an epistemic good is, according
to Fricker, ‘incidental.’5
Coady disagrees, arguing that since the epistemic goods in question are intrins-
ically epistemically valuable, it is not incidental that the distribution of these goods
is an epistemic issue.6 However, this misses the point. It is the injustice—the harm
caused—not the epistemic goods, which is not truly epistemic. Once we have identi-
ęed what epistemic goods are, the question of their fair distribution, as Coady himself
2. Discussion of Fricker’s second type of epistemic injustice, hermeneutical injustice, on which an
individual is disadvantaged because of a gap in her society’s understanding of a concept needed to
understand her experience, is beyond the scope of this essay.
3. David Coady, ‘Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice’, Episteme 7, no. 2 (2010): 101.
4. Ibid.
5. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 1.
6. Coady, ‘Two Concepts’, 106.
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notes,7 collapses into the same discussion of distributive justice that occurs for other
goods/property. Therefore, it is not a distinctly epistemic type of injustice.
The second conception of epistemic injustice, Fricker’s own, aims to be more fun-
damentally epistemic.8 The injustice lies in an individual not being acknowledged as
a knower, resulting in their testimony being undervalued.9 Crucially, note the harm
done is ‘not to be characterised as a non-receipt of one’s fair share of a good (cred-
ibility).’10 Instead, Fricker argues the harm is the distinctly epistemic harm of being
undermined in one’s capacity as a knower.
Before I examine whether epistemic injustice does involve distinctly epistemic
harms, in §2.2, I introduce some terminology from Fricker to further elucidate her
concept of epistemic injustice. In §2.3, I introduce two central cases which illustrate
Fricker’s characterisation of epistemic injustice.
2.2 Fricker on epistemic injustice
To understand Fricker’s characterisation of epistemic injustice, we must brieĚy con-
sider her views on testimony, the everyday epistemic practice of conveying knowledge
to others.11 When we listen to testimony, we face the decision of how much credibil-
ity to aĴribute to the speaker. Given the liĴle information we have on which to judge
the speaker’s credibility, Fricker suggests that we often use stereotypes as heuristics
to facilitate making credibility judgements.12 These stereotypes may be useful, preju-
dicing us to trust the testimony of teachers over our peers for instance. Yet they may
also introduce prejudice into our credibility judgements, causing testimonial injustice
whereby a speaker’s testimony is undervalued by a hearer on the basis of a facet of
their identity such as their gender or race.13
Fricker identięes two ways in which testimony can be dysfunctional as a result of
prejudice.14 First, in cases of credibility excess, a speaker receives more credibility that
she otherwise would have due to the prejudice of a speaker.15 For example, we at-
tribute an excess of credibility to doctors about medical maĴers because we are preju-
diced to think that doctors know about medicine. Second, in cases of credibility deęcit, a
speaker receives less credibility than she otherwise would have due to the prejudice of
7. Ibid., 103.
8. Ibid., 101.
9. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 1.
10. Ibid., 20.
11. Ibid., 16.
12. Ibid., 30–33.
13. Ibid., 1.
14. Note that prejudice may be positive or negative. To be prejudiced to think x is, roughly, to be
resistant to thinking not-x (ibid., 35).
15. Ibid., 17.
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the speaker.16 For example, the boy-who-cried-wolf receives a credibility deęcit from
his audience since they are prejudiced to think he is lying.
Fricker further distinguishes between systematic and incidental cases of injustice. In
incidental cases, the prejudice is highly localised to the situation. For instance, sup-
pose a student encounters a teacher with a strong prejudice against people who write
in fonts besides Times New Roman and undervalues the essay she submits in Calibri.
In this case, the prejudice in question is not commonly-held so will not generalise,
causing further injustices. In systematic cases, the prejudice which causes the credibil-
ity deęcit is pervasive and connects the epistemic injustice to other types of injustices.17
For example, testimonial injustices based on race or gender are examples of systematic
injustice.
2.3 Central cases
Fricker’s central cases of epistemic injustice are cases of systematic identity-prejudicial
credibility deęcit. By identity-prejudicial Fricker means that the prejudice that causes the
credibility deęcit is a negative identity prejudice, which we can understand simply as
a commonly-held disparaging association between a social group and one or more
aĴributes.18 These cases are central for Fricker because they connect to other forms of
social injustice that a subjectmight encounter, hence locating epistemic injusticewithin
the ‘broader paĴern of social injustice.’19
Central case 1 For our ęrst central case, let us follow Fricker in using a
story from Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird. Tom Robinson, a black man in
1930s Alabama, is on trial for beating and raping a white young woman. His
lawyer has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Tom cannot be responsible
for the beating yet despite this, the jury still refuse to believe a black man’s
testimony over the testimony of a white woman. Here, we have a clear-cut
case of identity-prejudicial credibility deęcit. The jury exhibits a negative
identity prejudice against Tom because they associate lying with being black.
This leads them to assume that Tom will not give testify the facts of the case.
Therefore, Tom is aĴributed a strong credibility deęcit due to the jury’s racial
negative identity prejudice and they cease to view him as a knower, that is
someone who is capable of knowing the facts and transmiĴing them. Fur-
thermore, since this prejudice is prevalent and the credibility deęcit is one of
many injustices the black community suěered, the injustice is systematic.20
16. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice.
17. Ibid., 27.
18. For a more precise deęnition, see ibid., 35
19. Ibid., 4.
20. Ibid., 23–28.
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A closely related term to testimonial injustice is silencing. I followKristie Dotson in
understanding silencing as the conjunction of two distinct epistemic injustices. Testi-
monial quieting occurs when ‘an audience fails to identify a speaker as a knower,’21 e.g.
in the Tom Robinson case as the jury does not identify Tom as a knower of the facts
of the case. The second kind of epistemic injustice is testimonial smothering, sometimes
referred to as self-silencing,which involves ‘the truncating of one’s own testimony.’22 In
testimonial smothering, the knowledge of the prevalence of identity-prejudicial cred-
ibility deęcits causes an individual to self-censure their speech, resulting in, to use
Fricker’s term, pre-emptive testimonial injustice.23 This leads us to our second central
case:
Central case 2 GLAAD deęnes Bisexual Erasure as ‘a pervasive problem
in which the existence or legitimacy of bisexuality (either in general or in re-
gard to an individual) is questioned or denied outright.’24 This phenomenon
can lead bisexuals to fear coming out since they think that they will not be
believed by someone who denies the existence of bisexuality. The pervasive-
ness of this problem leads some to self-silence if they feel unable to come out
to those around them because they do not think that they will be taken ser-
iously as a knower of the facts about their own sexuality.25 As our second
central case, let us take the example of a bisexual man in a relationship with
a woman who refrains from coming out to his friends and family out of fear
of not being believed or being misidentięed as homosexual.
Following Fricker I take both types of cases to be important examples of injustice
and I agree thatwe should spend time examining them to highlight the prevalent social
injustices they exemplify. However, in the following section I argue that we need a
clearer account of the harm done in these injustices in order to call what is occurring a
distinctly epistemic kind of injustice. Such an account should be able to make good on
Fricker’s claim that we can hurt in our capacity as a knower by distinguishing between
epistemic and moral harms.
21. Kristie Dotson, ‘Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing’, Hypatia 26, no. 2
(2011): 242.
22. Ibid., 244.
23. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 130.
24. GLAAD, ‘Erasure of Bisexuality’, accessed 17 February 2019, https://www.glaad.org/bisexual/
bierasure.
25. Note that I do not claim that all individuals who choose not to come out are self-silencing as there
are many legitimate reasons why someone may not come out which has nothing to do with fear of
encountering prejudice. However, when an individual would like to come out but feels unable to on
account of their knowledge of prejudicial aĴitudes it provides a case of self-silencing.
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3 Fricker’s account of the harm in epistemic injustice
We saw in §2.1 that Fricker’s aim in Epistemic Injustice was to identify a ‘distinctively
epistemic kind of injustice.’26 Yet, consider the following passage, in which Fricker
explains the importance of understanding the wrong done in epistemic injustices:
Any claim of injustice must rely on shared ethical intuition, but we achieve
a clearer idea of why something constitutes an injustice if we can analyse
the nature of the wrong inĚicted.27
I think Fricker is right to note that there is a moral judgement involved in calling
something an injustice, and that moreover injustice is commonly identięed by means
of ethical intuition or reasoning. However, if epistemic injustice is still to be properly
epistemic, then there must be a sense in which victims of epistemic injustice are harmed
epistemically, as well as morally.
While we might have expected Fricker to discuss the ways in which epistemic in-
justice leads to less overall transmission of knowledge, the harmFricker actually identi-
ęes is less about knowledge andmore about being recognised as a knower. In Chapter
6, Fricker clarięes her account of the harm in epistemic injustice, characterising it as a
kind of epistemic objectięcation, on which individuals are treated as ‘sources of informa-
tion’, not ‘informants’, or knowers.28 Crucially, Fricker claims that to treat someone as a
source of information or as an informant is to have a particular ethical aĴitude towards
them,29 not an epistemological one. She even adopts part of the Kantian framework to
show that it is immoral to treat someone as a mere source of information, just as it is
immoral to treat someone as ameremeans to an end rather than an end in themselves.30
The harm caused is moral, caused by a morally-impermissible ethical aĴitude, rather
than epistemic as Fricker originally promised.
Asking why Fricker identięes the harm done in cases of epistemic injustice in this
way reveals her virtue epistemological commitments. For a virtue epistemologist, the
lines between epistemic value and moral value are already blurred because they view
our role as knowers as an extension of our role asmoral agents (that is, howwe conduct
ourselves as knowers aěects should be guided by whether it would lead a Ěourishing
life or not).
Fricker’s own virtue epistemological leanings are clear from the fact that in addi-
tion to identifying the phenomenon of epistemic injustice, Fricker develops an account
of the virtue of epistemic justice, which also informs her suggestions for reducing epi-
26. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 1.
27. Ibid., 5.
28. Ibid., 134.
29. Ibid., 131.
30. Ibid., 133.
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stemic injustices.31 While a full analysis of this virtue is beyond the scope of the essay,
it is worth noting that Fricker aims the virtue to be ‘hybrid in kind: both intellectual
and ethical’32 just like epistemic injustice is meant to be both epistemic and ethical. Yet
the epistemological concerns, at least in the case of epistemic injustice, appear to be
considered less than the ethical concerns.
Indeed, the injustice Fricker describes could more accurately be called an identity
injustice, since it rests on the moral wrong of undermining the dignity of someone’s
identity as a knower. Consider the case of a sexist employee who fails to consider their
female boss a superior because they hold a negative identity prejudice that states that
women do not have leadership skills. It seems tome that the harm identięed by Fricker
in cases of epistemic injustice also occurs in this case. This shows that the fact that the
individual was undervalued as a knower is incidental, just as the fact that the goods
were epistemic goods was incidental to the kind of injustice involved in Coady’s ęrst
type of epistemic injustice. This is the case so long as we identify the wrong involved
in epistemic injustice as holding the wrong kind of ethical aĴitude towards someone
on the basis of a negative identity prejudice.
In sum: while there is no doubt that there is an important ethical dimension to
epistemic injustice, Fricker has failed to identify the distinctly epistemic aspect of epi-
stemic injustice which was meant to identify it as a sui generis kind of injustice. In the
remainder of this paper, I aim to rescue Fricker from this criticism by providing a way
of identifying epistemic injustice which retains the distinctly epistemic element of the
injustice. I do this by sketching a distinction between being harmed as a knower (an
epistemic harm) and being harmed as a moral agent (a moral harm). On this account,
the epistemic harm involved in epistemic injustice is not that someone is undervalued
as a knower but that a knowledge exchange has broken down, resulting in an obstacle
to gaining knowledge. Further, epistemic injustice occurs when this is due to amorally
culpable prejudicial credibility deęcit against a knower.
4 Two kinds of harm
In distinguishing between moral and epistemic harms, the goal is to provide a theory-
neutral account of the harms involved in cases of epistemic injustice in order to high-
light that it is an epistemic phenomenon. After sketching my distinction in §4.1-4.2, in
this section I show how the distinction accounts for the harms in the central cases of
epistemic injustice and motivate the use of my distinction by arguing that it explains
the intuitive harm that occurs in cases of credibility excess which Fricker dismisses.
31. Ibid., chap. 4.
32. Ibid., 6.
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4.1 Moral harm
I deęne a moral harm as a bad eěect on a moral agent resulting from a morally impermissible
action by a moral agent.
There are two important features of this deęnition. First, it is not complete since we
need to supply further deęnitions of ‘bad eěect’ and ‘morally impermissible’. How the
deęnition is Ěeshed out will therefore depend on the moral theory that one espouses;
a utilitarian might characterise ‘bad eěect’ as ‘non-optimum level of wellbeing’ while
the virtue ethicist could deęne it as ‘diminished Ěourishing.’ The beneęt of using a
loose deęnition is that it will show that moral harms are distinct from epistemic harms
not just on one particular moral theory but in a broader sense.
Second, we should understand ‘moral agent’ as amember of themoral community,
i.e. as someone who is morally responsible for their actions. Identifying the moral
harms of a situation further identięes where the blame should be placed, i.e. on the
moral agent who acted impermissibly. For example, acting on a morally culpable pre-
judice (e.g. negative identity prejudices) provides the moral harm in most epistemic
injustices.33
4.2 Epistemic harm
I deęne an epistemic harm as a restriction on access to a knowledge exchange.
The ęrst thing to note is that this deęnition is very broad. A young child who asks
how babies are made is harmed epistemically when their parents do not give them the
full answer, as is the student who cannot aěord a particular textbook, since both are
blocked from participation in an exchange of knowledge.
Secondly, note that not all epistemic harms are morally culpable. The former ex-
ample of the parents fudging the truth a liĴle provides an example of a morally innoc-
uous epistemic harm. Since we said that epistemic injustices involve both moral and
epistemic harms, note that not every case of epistemic harm will count as epistemic
injustice.
Instead, I suggest Fricker is right that for epistemic injustice to be an injustice, there
must be a credibility deęcit caused by identity-prejudice, although this should be un-
derstood as a moral, not an epistemic harm. A case counts as epistemic injustice iě it
includes:
(1) Moral and epistemic harms;
(2) The moral harm of being undermined as a knower due to a morally-culpable
33. I consider exceptions to this rule in §4.3 and §7.
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prejudice held by one’s audience.
4.3 Central cases revisited
First, in the TomRobinson case, which illustrates testimonial quietening, it is clear that
on all plausiblemoral theories there aremoral harms involved. Tom is harmedmorally
because he is discounted as a knower due to the morally impermissible prejudice of
the jury, resulting in an unjust verdict of guilt. He is harmed epistemically because he
cannot transfer his knowledge of the situation to the jury since they cannot believe his
testimony. Hence, he cannot participate in a knowledge exchange and is impeded in
his ability to be a knower.
An implication ofmy deęnition is that the jury are also harmed epistemically. Their
inability to believe Tom’s testimony blocks their receipt of the information they need
to come to a true belief about what happened. This obstruction of this knowledge
exchange counts as an epistemic harm to the jury as well as to Tom. Hence, victims
and perpetrators are both harmed epistemically in cases of epistemic injustice.
This is an important result for two reasons. First, it captures the idea that prejudice
is harmful to society since it silences whole social groups. We lose out on the know-
ledge that could be gained from their unique testimony and perspectives. Second, it
suggests even privilegedmembers of society should be motivated to combat epistemic
injustice, since they too are epistemically harmed by injustice.
In cases of testimonial smothering, the moral harm can be harder to identify. In the
case of the bisexual man, he might not come out to friends who would in fact support
him since his awareness of biphobia broadly leads him to fear a negative response
from his friends. We might not want to say that his friends have harmed him morally,
nor that there is a pre-emptive or counterfactual harm, since his friends would have
supported him. Instead, it looks like his society has harmed him morally, rather than
an individualmoral agent. When the prejudice involved in epistemic injustice is part of
the structure of society,34 the moral harms involvedmust be diěerent to when injustice
is the result of an individual’s prejudice. I return to this worry later.
By contrast, the epistemic harm involved is clear. Just as a shy student is harmed
epistemically by not engaging in discussion in class, in a similar way self-silencing is
epistemically harmful to listeners and speakers since a perspective is lost to the discus-
sion.35
34. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 10–11.
35. Note that epistemic blame must not relate to epistemic harm in an analogous way to moral blame
since then the self-silencer would be epistemically responsible for the harm caused. However, I leave
aside issues of developing an account of epistemic blame.
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4.4 Credibility excess revisited
An important feature of Fricker’s account of epistemic injustice is that it includes cases
of credibility deęcit, but excludes (most cases of) credibility excess.36 Fricker argues
that cases of credibility excess do not involve the withholding of ‘a proper respect for
the speaker qua subject of knowledge.’37 However, I agree with Medina that ‘Fricker’s
claim that a credibility excess does not handicap the speaker in the course of the ex-
change in the same way that a credibility deęcit does is dubious.’38
By using the distinction between epistemic andmoral harms, we can explain the in-
tuitive wrong involved in certain cases of credibility excess without having to further
characterise them as epistemic injustices. Consider Fricker’s case of the professor who
asks a junior colleague to give her comments on a paper she is presenting at a confer-
ence.39 The junior colleague admires the professor and gives too much beneęt of the
doubt, resulting in his comments being less critical than usual. The professor is harmed
epistemically since the junior colleague does not give their best comments on the paper
and this restricts the professor’s access to the colleague’s knowledge. Yet, while this is
as a result of prejudice—the junior colleague is prejudiced towards thinking the pro-
fessor has good suggestions (i.e. resistant to thinking otherwise)—it is plausibly not a
morally impermissible prejudice to hold. Hence, the professor is not harmed morally
by the encounter and it does not count as an epistemic injustice.
5 Objections
Having introduced my distinction between epistemic and moral harms and provide
some reason for thinking that it is useful, in this section I consider two possible objec-
tions to my account.
5.1 The epistemic harm harmful?
In §4, I aimed to provide a theory-neutral account ofmoral and epistemic harms. While
my deęnition of moral harm is neutral with regards to which moral theory is correct,
it may be objected that my deęnition of epistemic harm commits me to a particular
conception of epistemic value. The challenge my account faces is to answer how an
epistemic harm can be a kind of harm even using loose deęnitions of knowledge and
epistemic value.
36. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 21.
37. Ibid.
38. José Medina, ‘The Relevance of Credibility Excess in a Proportional View of Epistemic Injustice:
Diěerential Epistemic Authority and the Social Imaginary’, Social Epistemology 25, no. 1 (2011): 17.
39. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 18.
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The easiest way to see the harm in restricted access to a knowledge exchange is to
say that we lose out on the knowledge that wewould have gained from the knowledge
exchange. By knowledge, I here mean a weak sense of knowledge used by Goldman,
‘true belief’40 and as with the moral harm deęnition, I leave the Ěeshing out of the
concept to an individual’s preferred theory of knowledge. Yet we are left with a re-
gress of the question—we must now ask why it is harmful to miss out on knowledge,
particularly when it is understood as mere true belief.
The obvious response, versions of which are endorsed by Coady41 and Goldman
is that knowledge has intrinsic value (if one that can be trumped by other values).42
This view explains the wrong of cases of epistemic harm because being blocked from
a knowledge exchange then restricts one’s access to something which is intrinsically
valuable. However, we can question whether all true beliefs are indeed intrinsically
valuable: as Coady quips, ‘the project of maximising true beliefs seems at best to be
valuable for those who want to do well in the game of Trivial Pursui.’43
Consider as an example my true belief that ‘Meghan Markle’s baby is due in April
2019’. Prima facie, it does not appear to be intrinsically valuable to hold this belief, and
hence not all true beliefs are intrinsically valuable. Thus, to preserve the sense inwhich
we are harmed by missing out on knowledge we must amend the weak deęnition of
knowledge beyond ‘true belief’. I brieĚy consider two such aĴempts.
First, Greco argues that knowledge should be understood as true belief arrived at by
a method that deserves credit.44 The value of knowledge lies in arriving at the truth by
a reliable method rather than accidentally. However, consider an investigative journ-
alist who puts in the eěort to reach this true belief, perhaps even checking with Kate
Middleton’s obstetrician. The burden of proof is still on Greco to explain why using
reliable methods to arrive at trivial truths should be intrinsically valuable, particularly
when such methods and eěort could have been utilised to arrive at more important
truths.
Second, Coady, following Goldman, restricts intrinsic value to true beliefs that an-
swer:
First, questions the agent happens to ęnd interesting, second, questions the
agent would ęnd interesting if he or she had thought of them, and third,
questions that the agent has an interest in having answered.45
Adopting this view implies knowers are only harmed epistemically when they lose
40. Alvin I. Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World (Oxford University Press, 1999), 5.
41. Coady, ‘Two Concepts’, 106.
42. Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World, 6.
43. Coady, ‘Two Concepts’, 103.
44. John Greco, ‘Knowledge as Credit for True Belief’, in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and
Epistemology, ed. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski (Clarendon Press, 2003), 116.
45. Coady, ‘Two Concepts’, 103.
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out on interesting true beliefs. Since such beliefs are taken to be intrinsically valuable,
we can explain why cases of epistemic harm are harmful.
The problem is that the inclusion of an agent’s interests makes the value more in-
strumental than intrinsic. It is plausible that knowing ‘Meghan Markle’s baby is due
in April 2019’ is instrumentally valuable to an avid royalist, aiding their goal to know
trivia about royalty. However, I see no reason why being an avid royalist makes it an
intrinsically valuable true belief to hold.
Yet, even if knowledge is only instrumentally valuable, I argue that we can still see
the harm in epistemic harm. To the extent that our goals/interests are prudentially
valuable to us, knowledge which furthers these goals/interests in valuable. Hence, a
breakdown in an exchange of (interesting) knowledge does result in the loss of some-
thing valuable, and thereby we are harmed.
5.2 A distinct kind of harm?
Having established that knowledge need only be instrumentally valuable for epistemic
harm to be harmful, a second possibly objection is that making this move causes the
distinction to collapse between epistemic and moral harms. The worry here is that if
our goals/interests are harmed, thenwe are harmedmorally every timewe are harmed
epistemically.
The answer to this concern is to point out that our goals are not always moral. To
illustrate, suppose you walk down the street and encounter an obviously shady char-
acter wearing a balaclava and holding an empty bag labelled ‘$ $ $’. If they ask you
where the nearest bank is and you purposely deceive them, the would-be criminal is
harmed epistemically since they lose out on interesting knowledge (i.e. knowledge
that furthers their interest in robbing the bank). Yet, they are not harmedmorally since
(plausibly) you have not acted morally impermissibly by obstructing their own im-
moral act. The distinction survives since there are cases which involve epistemic, but
not moral, harms.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I aimed to do three things. First, I argued that Fricker’s account of the
harm done in cases of epistemic injustice misses the epistemic harm caused and fails
to establish why epistemic injustice is ‘distinctly epistemic.’ Second, I sketched deęni-
tions of epistemic andmoral harms and used these to analyse key cases of epistemic in-
justice and to identify the intuitive harm in some instances of credibility excess. Third,
I responded to possible objections to my distinction and argued that we can separate
the moral and epistemic elements of epistemic injustice.
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One remaining worry with my argument is that it is diĜcult to aĴribute moral
blame in epistemic injustice cases such as testimonial smothering. The crux of this is-
sue is that the prejudice involved is not tied to an individual, but rather part of the fabric
of the society we live in, i.e. it is structural. For example, in our second central case the
mere awareness that pervasive biphobia and bisexual erasure exists can cause testi-
monial smothering, independent of any individual’s biphobic belief. This threatens
my suggestion that identifying the moral harm in a case of epistemic injustice further
identięes who is to blame.
Even where the prejudice can be aĴributed to an individual, the prejudice is often
an implicit bias the individual may be unaware they have. It is tempting to say that we
cannot be blameworthy for such implicit biases. Yet, while this may be comforting, it
risks demotivating our aĴempts to resist our implicit biases by assuming we have no
control over our biases. Instead, there is empirical evidence that suggests we can im-
prove the situation through reĚective self-regulation.46 Given that such self-regulation
will be a long and eěortful process, we need a motivation to even try. Taking respons-
ibility for our implicit biases by seeing the moral harms that they cause provides an
essential ęrst step towards motivating the eěort involved in such self-regulation.47
Of course, Fricker is right to argue that combating epistemic injustice requires both
individual reĚective self-regulation and enacting changes in structural mechanisms.48
These are important topics and provide fruitful areas for further research. However,
one promising direction for identifying the moral harms in structural epistemic in-
justice is to say that we are all to blame. Consequently, we are all responsible for
working towards changes in ourselves, and in our society.
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